A former employee of a Toms River, New Jersey car dealership, identified in public reports as Martin D'Amato, was sentenced in early October 2025 to seven years in New Jersey state prison for stealing more than $1.3 million from his employer.

Prosecutors stated that D'Amato created multiple limited liability companies that appeared to be legitimate advertising and marketing vendors. D'Amato then used an online payment processor to submit invoices to the dealership for services that were never performed.

The dealership paid those invoices, and the payment processor transferred funds to bank accounts controlled by D'Amato.

Authorities indicated the theft occurred for several years before it was uncovered and reported. D'Amato pled guilty to a single count of theft and, in addition to his prison term, was ordered to pay restitution of approximately $1,329,677 to the dealership and, in part, to an insurance carrier that covered some of the loss.

Source: https://www.carpro.com/blog/former-dealership-employee-sentenced-to-7-years-1.3-million-fine

Commentary

In the above matter, an employee exploited weak controls by creating shell "vendors" issuing fake invoices. For executives and managers across industries, the case is a clear reminder that the biggest dollar losses can come from trusted insiders who understand billing workflows, approval gaps, and system blind spots.

The use of multiple limited liability companies and an online payment processor show how easily modern financial tools can be turned into channels for concealed theft when vendor vetting and payment controls are weak.

From a loss prevention perspective, organizations should assume that any employee with authority over purchasing, vendor setup, or accounts payable has both opportunity and knowledge to commit fraud if controls are lax.

Practical prevention steps for employers include:

· Require dual approval for new vendors and for payments above defined thresholds

· Verify vendor legitimacy using independent checks such as tax identification, business registry, and direct contact

· Prohibit one person from both initiating and approving payments, especially in marketing and procurement

· Run regular analytics to identify unusual payment patterns, duplicate invoices, or shared bank accounts among vendors

· Review employee ownership interests annually to detect overlaps with vendors or contractors

· Ensure that fraud allegations can be reported through confidential hotlines without retaliation

The final takeaway is that organizations that invest in layered controls, independent oversight, and proactive monitoring are far more likely to stop insider schemes quickly before a major loss occurs.

Additional Sources: https://www.cbtnews.com/toms-river-dealership-employee-sentenced-in-1-3-million-fraud-case/; https://patch.com/new-jersey/tomsriver/man-who-stole-1-3m-toms-river-auto-dealership-sentenced; https://www.jerseyshoreonline.com/berkeley/beachwood-man-sentenced-to-prison-for-1-3-million-theft-scheme/